The likelihood that the firm's information systems are insufficiently protected against certain kinds of damage or loss is known as "systems risk." Risk can be managed or reduced when managers are aware of the full range of controls available and implement the most effective controls. Unfortunately, they often lack this knowledge and their subsequent actions to cope with systems risk are less effective than they might otherwise be. This is one viable explanation for why losses from computer abuse and computer disasters today are uncomfortably large and still so potentially devastating after many years of attempting to deal with the problem. Results of comparative qualitative studies in two information services Fortune 500 firms identify an approach that can effectively deal with the problem. This theory-based security program includes: (1) use of a security risk planning model, (2) education/training in security awareness, and (3) Countermeasure Matrix analysis.
Introduction
The likelihood that a firm's information systems are insufficiently protected against certain kinds of damage or loss is known as "systems risk." The underlying problem with systems risk is that managers are generally unaware of the full range of actions that they can take to reduce risk. Because of this lack of knowledge, subsequent actions to plan for and cope with systems risk are less effective than they need be. This is one viable explanation for why losses from computer abuse and computer disasters today are still so uncomfortably large and potentially devastating.
Fortunately, there are well established behavioral theories and other conceptual models that offer insight into how managers can cope with systems risk. First, general deterrence theory posits generic actions that directly and indirectly lower systems risk, exemplified, in the systems arena, by actions taken by computer security officers (Straub, 1990) . Second, Simon's (1980) model of managerial decision-making offers direction as to generic stages in an effective planning approach.
An agenda for management action is proposed to deal with the problem. Managers should initiate a theory-based security program that includes: (1) use of a security risk planning model, (2) education in security awareness, and (3) Countermeasure Matrix analysis. The viability of the approach is validated through qualitative studies in two information services Fortune 500 firms.
Threats to Organizational Information Resources
Information security continues to be ignored by top managers, middle managers, and employees alike. The result of this unfortunate neglect is that organizational systems are far less secure than they might otherwise be and that security breaches are far more frequent and damaging than is necessary.
The underlying problem is that many managers are not well versed on the nature of systems risk, likely leading to inadequately protected systems.
Organizational information systems today remain in jeopardy. Over the years study after study has documented actual and potential systems losses (Parker, 1976; 1981; 1983; Hoffer and Straub, 1989; Loch, Carr, and Warkentin, 1992) . A partial listing of institutional sponsors of high profile studies includes: the U.S. Government (Kusserow, 1983; Barnett (1982a, 1982b) , the American Bar Association (1984) , the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (1984) , Ernst and Young (Burger, 1993) , and Ernst & Young (Panettieri, 1995) , and, project risk, the risk that a systems development project will fail (Keil, 1995) . In either case, to assess overall risk, one needs to have some idea about the probability of suffering losses and the extent of loss.
Systems risks vary, but one useful division is that between the risk of a disaster and the risk of a computer abuse. In all likelihood, the most serious risk confronting an organization is that missioncritical information systems will become unavailable to process the company's basic transactions. The nightmare scenario for this is the "disaster" or "catastrophe" (Peach, 1991 )  events such as hurricane, earthquake, fire, or sabotage.
The risk of catastrophic loss of the organization's systems notwithstanding, managers should consider the threat from unauthorized and/or illicit penetration of the firm's computers, that is, computer abuse, with equal concern (Hoffer and Straub, 1989) . Bad actors who exploit vulnerabilities in systems occur among disgruntled employees and ex-employees and the persistence of this threat is testimony to the need for on-going vigilance. Neumann (1994) reports, for example, that insider manipulation of currency transactions via computer cost Volkswagen $260 million while a fraudulent EFT transfer, which would have cost the Bank of Switzerland $54 million, was only averted at the last minute. While garden variety electronic thefts, destructiveness, and espionage in legacy systems are serious in their own right, more recently abusers have targeted the Internet. In the last few years, Internet connectivity and security on the World Wide Web pose the most significant threat for many organizations (Arnum, 1995) . The possible strategic benefits from electronic commerce are clearly attractive to many firms, but some are entering into this venture without fully recognizing the potential aftereffects of lax security.
The potential for security exposure from viruses crossing over networks, which know no international boundaries, for instance, is virtually unlimited. Although outsiders (many of whom, of course, are hackers) have historically been a relatively small percentage of computer abusers (Hoffer and Straub, 1989; Gips, 1995; King, 1995) , the persistence of their attacks and their resistance to deterrent countermeasures makes them particularly dangerous (Straub, Carlson, and Jones, 1992; Straub and Widom, 1984) . They can attack systems directly or set loose viruses, which estimates suggest that viruses are successfully attacking systems over 20,000 times per year in France (Forcht, 1992) while in the US over 70% of organizations are experiencing serious virus attacks (Panettieri, 1995) . Moreover, the vast majority of managers say that systems risks have escalated in the past five years and that their organizations have suffered financial losses from computer abuse (Panettieri, 1995) .
In spite of the seriousness of systems security risk from disasters and computer abuse, many organizations are either completely unprotected or insufficiently protected. Numerous surveys and other studies report this same lack of preparedness over and over again (e.g., Loch et al., 1992; Hoffer and Straub, 1989; Brown, 1993) .
Prior Thinking about Systems Risk
If the threat is so clear, then how can it be true that both IS and general managers may be under-prepared in coping with systems risk? If managerial perception of systems risk is lower than it should be, why is this the case? How does a manager develop a sense that his or her risk-cost tradeoff is well balanced? While a few studies have addressed this issue conceptually, one study has explored the issue from both a theoretical and empirical perspective (Goodhue and Straub, 1991) . They argue that managerial concern about the organization's security is a function of: (1) risk inherent in the industry, (2) the extent of the effort already taken to control these risks, and (3) individual factors such as awareness of previous systems violations, background in systems work, etc., as shown in Figure 1 .
Independent corroboration of these factors has been reported by Dixon, Marston, and Collier (1992) .
How can managers' consciousness about security risk be heightened? If this model is accurate, then clearly it is necessary to alter managers' perceptions of the three underlying components of risk in order to affect their overall perception of risk. Having a firm grasp on the level of systems risk to which the industry as whole is exposed, reflected in the "Organizational Environment" construct in the model above, would clearly be helpful. How managers develop beliefs about industry risk, however, is beyond the scope of the current research because it involves relatively straightforward reading and/or sharing of knowledge of the risk among industry groups.
But the second and third model components, "IS Environment" and "Individual Characteristics," offer managers a good opportunity for learning and, hence, improvement. Managers should very likely be well informed as to the local incidence of computer abuse and susceptibility to damage, as shown in the "Individual Characteristics" component of the model. That one's system was attacked three times last month, once successfully penetrated, causing a loss of one hour of system availability is the type of localized knowledge we are referring to. As we shall see later in the section entitled "Intervention Elements," such knowledge is instrumental in managerial risk analysis. 
Figure 1. Model for Managerial Perceptions of Security Risk
The second model component, "IS Environment," reflects managers' basic understanding of the range of technical and managerial controls that can cope with risk from disasters and computer abuse.
It also reflects actions that can be taken based on that knowledge. If the firm's customer base has online connections to the firm, for instance, there are hard box solutions such as secure modems that can be used to address security issues; software solutions, such as passwords, may also be acceptable.
This knowledge determines the alternatives to be considered in security response decision-making.
In addition, these areas are of greatest need in that manager's knowledge of actions to reduce local systems risk has been found to be fragmentary and incomplete in numerous prior studies (Loch et al, 1992 ; Straub, 1986a; Straub, 1986b 
Effective Actions for Managing Systems Risk
For years, the received wisdom of security experts is that countermeasures, strategies that adopted to reduce systems risk, fall into four distinct, sequential activities, namely: (1) deterrence, (2) prevention, (3) detection, and (4) recovery (Parker, 1981; Martin, 1973; Forcht, 1994) . Not surprisingly, perhaps, these four classes of sequential actions have a strong theoretical basis.
The theory that best explains the effectiveness of these countermeasures is general deterrence theory. Used in the study of criminals and other anti-social personalities, the theory is well established in criminology (Blumstein, 1978; Pearson and Weiner, 1985) . It posits that individuals with an instrumental intent to commit anti-social acts can be dissuaded by the administration of strong disincentives and sanctions relevant to these acts. In more easily understood terms, active and visible policing is thought to lower computer abuse by convincing potential abusers that there is too high certainty of getting caught and punished severely.
General deterrence theory has been applied successfully to the IS environment by Straub and his research partners (Straub, Carlson, and Jones, 1994; Straub, 1990; Straub and Nance, 1990; Hoffer and Straub, 1989) . The basic argument in this work is that information security actions can deter potential computer abusers from committing acts that implicitly or explicitly violate organizational policy.
Moreover, they have found empirical evidence that security actions can lower systems risk. Specific application of general deterrence theory to information security is based on the underlying relationship between activities of managers and that of computer abusers (Nance and Straub, 1988) . Figure 2 illustrates the range of possible security actions and their interrelationships.
With respect to risk from computer abuse, this model asserts that managers are themselves the key to successfully deterring, preventing, and detecting abuse as well as pursuing remedies and/or punishing offenders for abuse. It should be noted that these constructs and inter-relationships, which are explicitly expressed in Figure 2 , "The Security Action Cycle," are implicit in general deterrence theory, specifically in the lag effects of policing actions on subsequent anti-social acts.
A certain portion of potential system abuse is allayed by deterrent techniques, such as policies and guidelines for proper system use and by reminders to users to change their passwords.
Deterrent countermeasures tend to be passive in that they have no inherent provision for enforcement.
They depend wholly on the willingness of system users to comply. Security awareness programs are a form of deterrent countermeasure which deserve special mention here because educating users as well as their superiors about security yields major benefits. These sessions convey knowledge about risks in the organizational environment; emphasize actions taken by the firm, including policies and sanctions for violations; and reveal threats to local systems and their vulnerability to attack. A major reason for initiating this training, however, is to convince potential abusers that the company is serious about securing its systems and will not treat intentional breaches of this security lightly. In essence, potent security awareness training stresses the two central tenets of general deterrence theory  certainty of sanctioning and severity of sanctioning (Blumstein, 1978) . When potential abusers choose to ignore deterrents, the next line of system defense is preventives, like locks on computer room doors and password access controls. Preventives are active countermeasures with inherent capabilities to enforce policy and ward off illegitimate use (Gopal and Sanders, 1992; 1997 Managers, both systems and general managers alike, are directly involved in identifying those who violate security (Straub and Nance, 1990; Hoffer and Straub, 1989) and in applying the appropriate actions to deter, prevent, detect, and remedy computer abuse. Certain of these activities are particularly onerous in terms of time and effort expended. Detective activities, for example, require the investigation of suspicious activities, most of which prove to be false positives in suspicious incidents reports. Knowledge of the most effective combination of disincentives and other strategies for managing risk, is, therefore, of special value.
Deterrence
There is limited evidence in practice for the effectiveness of these techniques despite the strong theoretical basis (see Straub, 1990, however) . This raises a critical research question: Are managers fully aware of the range of generic security actions that research links to lower systems risk (Straub, 1986b; ? Lack of awareness would be suggestive about the probity of the Goodhue-Straub model of security concern (1991). Correcting this could also lead to managerial action plans. Beyond lack of awareness, it seems likely that managers will stress certain countermeasures over others. Prior work suggests that preventives would be best known and other countermeasures less understood.
Ancillary research questions arise from this contrast: Can security awareness programs that stress theoretically-grounded countermeasures affect manager's thinking about security and will managers actually adopt into practice forms of planning that reflect such theoretically-grounded countermeasures? Can other theory-based security planning techniques affect how managers plan for security? Answers to these questions would be insightful in that managers may or may not be swayed by and induced to put into practice theory-based approaches to lowering risk. Accordingly, we studied the following two propositions:
Proposition 1: Managers are aware of only a fraction of the full spectrum of actions that can be taken to reduce systems risk.
Proposition 2: Managers exposed to theory-grounded security planning techniques will be inclined to employ these in their planning processes.
Research Approach
To empirically study these propositions, comparative qualitative studies were conducted in two
Fortune 500 firms with information technology services in the southeastern United States. Because security is an extremely sensitive subject for many organizations, firm identity has been disguised. approximately the same total revenues, and structure information delivery in a markedly similar fashion.
Information security had been staffed at both organizations within the IS department for many years. In both, disaster recovery plans were operational, whereas application security was less well developed.
What is, perhaps, even more important is that neither organization had long term experience in offering user/manager education in security awareness at the time of the qualitative studies. Because each of these organizations presented, in effect, a green field setting for this important aspect of security, it was possible to compare their beginning points and progress toward strengthening security along several lines. A comparison of the firms, propositions investigated, and methods employed appears in Table 1 . 
Firm Pseudonym Abbreviation

CDI Study Details
In Customer Data, Inc. (CDI), 30 intensive interviews were conducted with all levels of management, including three Vice Presidents over a four month period. The interviews were conducted in a southeastern city, two midwestern cities, and a western city. Professionals working with systems on a daily basis, both in the IS department and in functional areas, were also a critical component of the sampling. Interviews lasted from one hour to over two hours. The interview script that was employed appears in the Appendix. There were several specific questions that attempted to gain insight into the security planning process used at the firm. Question 4 in the interview script illustrates the straightforward approach taken in these questions: "If you were asked to plan for some new security measures at the company, how would you go about doing this? Are there certain stages or phases that might be involved in your planning for improved security?" (The underlining in the script was intended to remind the interviewer to stress these words).
To bring a measure of objectivity to this data, interviews were transcribed and thematically coded for indications that participants were cognizant of the meaning or value of one of the particular countermeasures. They were then qualitatively analyzed for dominant and sub-thematic patterns. The content analysis process was relatively simple in that one coder was used. The coder was intimately familiar with the countermeasure themes as a result of fifteen years of research and consulting experience in the computer security field. Whereas multiple coders would have been preferable from a methodological standpoint, the sheer volume of data accumulated in both studies meant that this approach was too costly.
CPC Study Details
CPC differed in one regard from CDI which made it exceptionally valuable for this comparative qualitative study. Through an intervention, it became possible to educate top managers and other professionals at CPC in concepts and principles of theory-grounded models of security planning and then to systematically observe if and how they used this information in their later security planning.
Action research, an interpretive mode of inquiry, was used to analyze the data in this case. In addition, meetings with top management, including the President and several levels of Vice Presidents, were held on a monthly basis during the study period. These sessions were both informational and decision-making sessions. Investigation and approval of security initiatives, hence, had continuous top management involvement.
Meeting minutes, notes, internal memoranda, presentation overheads, analyses of security initiatives, and CPC customer interviews provided a rich source of data for documenting the planning effort and multiple chains of evidence with respect to the propositions. Even though there were no formal interviews with the project team or top management, all told, approximately 1000 pages of documentation were amassed over the 15 months of the project. Subjective, interpretive analysis of this data revealed extremely interesting patterns in how the participants learned about and subsequently responded to the organizational responses embodied in the Security Action Cycle.
The rich data source that resulted from CPC security initiative was interpreted in a similar fashion to that of CDI data. Major themes related to the Security Action Cycle were pattern analyzed and conclusions were drawn from this analysis.
Intervention Elements
Proposition 2 posits that when managers have theory-based planning models for strengthening security, managers will be motivated to utilize these tools. In creating the intervention during the action research, these models were based on the best conceptual and theoretical evidence we have on the nature of systems risk and how to cope with it.
There were three elements to the intervention implemented at CPC: (1) a security risk planning model, (2) a security awareness training program, and (3) a Countermeasure Matrix model. Each of these will be explained in greater detail below.
Intervention Element #1: The Security Risk Planning Model
To deal with managers' need for a deeper understanding of the full spectrum of risk management responses, the Security Risk Planning model, grounded in Baskerville (1993) and Simon (1960) and presented in Figure 3 below, served to guide the overall security planning effort. This model derives its structure from Simon's model of decision-making (1960) . Building from a definition of information security planning, the model places risk analysis in its proper logical position as a bridge between problem formulation and generation of alternatives and preceding the planning decision phase.
This normative model of the entire planning process includes not only risk analysis but also the constituents of other critical stages and their outcomes. This model is presented in Figure 3 and constituents of each of the phases, as well as an additional phase for implementation, are shown in Table   2 below. 
Figure 3. Phases in Security Risk Planning
Current thinking and practice were also lacking in an effective mechanism to evaluate the fit between business needs and potential solutions. At present, the literature advocates only a crude costbenefit mechanism that falls far short of the kind of intellectual tools that would lead to high quality, scientific assessment and good planning decisions (Baskerville, 1991) . The problem with such present first generation tools (Baskerville, 1993 ) is that they are atheoretical (Hoffman, 1989) . As simple heuristics that estimate rough-cut costs of a unsecured system and benefits from implementing security controls, they play down or completely ignore the behavioral side of the phenomenon of computer abuse. Present atheoretical techniques are also incapable of evaluating the synergy offered by combinations or sets of security controls. In fact, practitioner and academic interest in information security (IS) planning has been marginal. Planning for security is mentioned only briefly in this literature (viz., McLean and Soden, 1978; Steiner, 1979 Steiner, , 1982 King, 1984; Venkatraman, 1985-86; Ramanujam and Venkatraman, 1987; Lederer and Sethi, 1991) . These studies neither detail the nature of security planning nor the process stages required for a successful planning effort.
Likewise in the more specialized security and control literature, the issue of security planning has not been dealt with. Although Parker (1981; 1983) , Fisher (1984 ) Caroll (1987 , Baskerville (1988; , and Forcht (1994) all discuss means by which threats to systems can be identified and countermeasures proposed, they do not discuss this process as a planning process per se. Stages in a normative planning process are not articulated in this literature nor are the desired outcomes of the stages.
Phase
Phase Name Description I
Recognition of Security Problems
The identification and formulation of problems with respect to the risk of IS security breaches or computer disasters II
Risk Analysis
The analysis of the security risk inherent in these identified problem areas; threat identification and prioritization of risks III Alternatives Generation
The generation of solutions to meet organizational needs specified during risk analysis IV Decisions Matching threats with appropriate solutions; selection and prioritization of security projects V Implementation Realizing the plans by incorporating the solutions into the on-going security of the organization Baskerville (1993) argues that planning for security should ideally be incorporated systems development and security controls designed at the logical systems level in parallel with actual system functionality. Recognizing that systems projects seldom unfold in this fashion, Baskerville goes on to argue that ex post security enhancement can indeed be undertaken for existing and legacy systems. The broad outlines of his planning process are not dissimilar to those shown in Figure 3 .
Other than Baskerville (1993) , the scholarly and consulting literatures on security do not provide a commonly agreed upon conceptual model for the security planning process. Much of the literature, indeed, specifies in detail only one of the central activities of the process, namely, risk analysis (Parker, 1981 (Parker, , 1983 Fisher, 1984; Caroll, 1987; Badenhorst and Elof, 1989; Eloff, Labuschagne, and Badenhorst, 1993) . Whereas von Solms, van de Haar, von Solms, and Caelli (1994), de Konig (1995) , and others discuss various types of planning (e.g., disaster recovery planning vis-à-vis contingency planning vis-à-vis physical security planning, etc.), there is little in the public domain describing an overall approach to security planning and evaluation or the specific details of this process.
The Security Risk Planning Model was, de facto, the organizing principle behind the security initiative at CPC. Needs were determined in the early phases of the project and decision choices were made after a significant effort in alternatives generation. This approach was articulated in the early stages of the project and followed rather closely as the project progressed. The implementation phase of the project followed the straight-forward planning phases, as in most projects.
Intervention Element #2: Security Aw areness Program
Phase I of the security risk planning model just discussed requires that decision-maker awareness of industry standards for security is sufficient, as is knowledge of local security conditions and available countermeasures within one's own firm. During this phase, managers and security professionals should identify and formulate problems with IS security breaches or computer disasters in the organization, as suggested by the Goodhue-Straub Model for Managerial Perceptions of Security Risk (1991; Figure 1 above ).
An effective way of achieving this is through security awareness training, or the training of managers and other professionals in proper use of system assets. In this training, security specialists review with employees policies (if they exist), system authorizations, conditionalities for use, methods for changing passwords, penalties for security breaches, and other topics that have a bearing on preventing misuse of system assets. The training should also make participants aware of the general effectiveness of deterrent, preventive, detective, and remedial countermeasures in lowering systems risk, as articulated in the Security Action Cycle (Figure 2 above).
Forward-looking and proactive security awareness program are exceptional in most industries.
Fewer than half of organizations likely have active security awareness programs in place; moreover, about two thirds believe that information security is not a significant issue (Kearns, 1994) . Such views fly in the face of commissioned studies that have consistently concluded otherwise (Kusserow, 1984; American Bar Association, 1983; Dixon, et al., 1992) .
At CPC, security awareness training was not conducted as a specifically designated training session; nevertheless, the knowledge that would be imparted in formal sessions was communicated informally to team members and management by both the resident security staff and the action researcher during meetings and work sessions in the early phases of the project.
Intervention Element #3: Countermeasure Matrix
In making decisions in Phase IV from among the security alternatives generated in Phase III, managers may enhance their decision-making with the assistance of a "Countermeasure Matrix," an example of which is shown below in Table 2 . Many of the intellectual tools to improve this phase focus on risk analysis of security threats (Eloff, Labuschagne, and Badenhorst, 1993; Wood, 1988) . Two While, the UK assessment methodology CRAMM goes beyond risk analysis to recommend prioritized countermeasures for assessed risks (Farquhar, 1991) , implementation requires in-depth security knowledge (Farquhar, 1991) . Like the "Countermeasure Matrix," BDSS is another theory-based tool that suggests appropriate safeguards (Baskerville, 1993) .
Whereas the problem recognition and alternatives generation phases have received some attention in the general management literature, the planning decision phase (Phase IV) has received less treatment in the security literature (see Parker, 1981 Parker, , 1983 Fisher, 1984; Caroll, 1987; Wood, 1988; Baskerville, 1988 Baskerville, , 1993 Forcht, 1994 , for example). Thus, new intellectual tools that can assist managers in matching security risk with an appropriate set of security controls is useful. Moreover, as is evident from the preceding discussions, such a tool should be based not on heuristics alone, but, if at all possible, firmly grounded in theory.
The "Countermeasure Matrix" model, hence, is a theory-based, analytical tool for evaluating the overall effectiveness of security options. Table 2 is an illustration of how this model would be applied to a particular security problem or need.
To understand the essential features of the technique and see how these features might be used in practice, consider the following situation. Let us assume that an organization has decided to give customers electronic access to their mainframe product/pricing database and has had customers sign non-disclosure agreements as part of a contractual relationship. Let us further assume that the company would like to limit the extent to which non-customers and competitors can gain access to this same data.
Thus, the firm wishes to discourage non-customers and competitors from accessing the database while making the database accessible to customers. Should security fail for some reason, the firm would also like to be able to identify the offender and seek restitution in the courts.
A requirement for effectively using the matrix is that some persons of groups of persons in the organization have sufficient expertise to be able to identify the full range of security solutions that could meet the firm's needs in this case. Let us make the assumption that viable alternatives have been assembled by this expert and that two security approaches  PINs or personal identification numbers and token-exchanging modems are selected for further evaluation.
These proposed security solutions demonstrate how the matrix might be populated. The matrix is formed by assigning methods in the Security Action Cycle to the row headings and proposed organizational solutions to the column headings. The cells in the matrix allow managers to compare the effect of proposed solutions across the security countermeasures of deterrence, prevention, detection, and remedies. PINs have been evaluated as effectively meeting the goal of deterrence because individuals identify themselves to the computer system via this token. Thus, it may be assumed that individuals recognize that every interaction with the system can be linked directly back to them. The token-exchanging modems, conversely, are a "hard box" device that in an open office may be shared, lost, or stolen and, hence, not necessarily identify access by specific individuals. Therefore, it has little or no deterrent effect. 
Application of the Countermeasure Matrix to a Problem
The use of the "Countermeasure Matrix" highlights strengths and weaknesses of proposed security solutions to meet the firm's needs. All things being equal, the PIN solution in Table 2 meets more of the security goals of the organization than the token-exchanging modems. When planning for security, therefore, managers can use the matrix as a technique for assessing both the short and long term effect of security options by considering the immediate effect of deterrence, prevention, etc. as well as the downstream feedback effects. When a decision must be made between options, the application of the matrix provides guidelines for a rational choice.
The matrix can also suggest how the organization can respond if certain contingencies must be taken into account. If there would be reason to suspect that PINs might not always be tightly guarded by customers and might fall into the hands of competitors, for example, the matrix indicates that tokenexchanging modems in addition to PINs would be a good means by which to prevent unauthorized access. To completely compromise the system in this situation, competitors would also have to acquire token-exchanging modems.
Placing the Interventions into their Overall Security Context
As Figure 4 shows, the three interventions being proposed and studied here fit into the context of security planning in a relatively simple way. The Security Risk Planning Model provides the baseline of phases I-IV to which are added the implementation phase (V) and feedback loops in Figure 4 .
Awareness programs aid managers and professionals in identifying security issues (Phase I). Awareness is the first charge of security training and one of the tools that can structure this discussion and help to identify problems is the Goodhue-Straub model (Figure 1) . The model presents to employees the general concept that risk and security awareness are a function of both their industry and firm's susceptibility to abuse and the countermeasures taken to control risk. Risk analysis (Phase II) is affected by security awareness programs in that these programs inform managers and professionals about specific local susceptibility to certain threats, as shown in the "Individual Characteristics" component of the Goodhue-Straub model (Figure 1 ). They also serve to inform users about the entire process of designing effective organizational responses (Phase III). This phase conveys knowledge of the possible actions that can be taken to reduce risk, i.e., the "IS Environment" or second component of the Goodhue-Straub model (Figure 1 ). The Security Action Cycle is an example of the actions that can be taken. Knowing and using this model can help in generating security alternatives. Finally, the Countermeasure Matrix is proposed as a useful analytical technique for making the final decision as to which option provides maximal security impact (Phase IV).
Once security is implemented, feedback from the relative success of the project can reinforce knowledge gained during the earlier phases or it can assist in balancing expectations in subsequent projects (Senge, 1990) . 
Recognition of
Method of Comparison and Manipulation
The basic method used in the research was that of comparison and manipulation (Cook and Campbell, 1979; Yin, 1994) . Because proposition 1 was examined at both firms, the comparison allows us to determine how managers frame questions dealing with improved security and, at the same time, to ensure that the firms did not demonstrate wide variation in this fundamental aspect of security planning. If the firms do not differ in these underlying initial conditions, then the argument that propositions found to be true in both settings could apply to settings beyond the sample is more persuasive.
Manipulation occurs in laboratory or field experimentation when reputed causes are consciously manipulated and effects observed in as unobtrusive manner as possible (Stone, 1978; Fromkin and Streufert, 1976) . In action research, there is also conscious manipulation of reputed causes; in this situation, though, the researcher is an active and obvious observer of the phenomenon under scrutiny (Jenkins, 1985; Yin, 1994) . Evidence in favor of propositions is strengthened when a researcher manipulates a reputed cause and subsequently observes the predicted effect, as in the case of the interventions in the present study.
Validity of Research Approach
It should be noted that while the current research did not strictly follow the classic stages of research as described by authors such as Jenkins (1985) , it is clearly within the purview of action research studies now being conducted (Baskerville, et al, in press ). Both projects were originally consulting projects, which, at the same time, were consciously conceived as research projects. The participating organizations were aware that the data gathered would, ideally, find its way into academic papers dealing with security. Moreover, the signed non-disclosure documents did not preclude the possibility of wider dissemination of this information so long as company names were disguised. In fact, both firms were very helpful in reading, reacting to, and eventually approving versions of the paper for submission to academic journal review.
The research varied from classic research stages in one other respect. While the research questions were clear from the beginning of the first project, the design itself evolved. The combination of action research and interviews to study managerial responses to security situations progressed in an organic way rather than being part of any preset, original design. Nevertheless, the value of triangulating on the phenomenon through two markedly different methods is well known (Fielding and Fielding, 1986 ) and we were able to capitalize on these research capabilities in this case.
With respect to the validity of the action research component, it is critical that models being examined are integrated into the process (Schein, 1987) . Participants in the CPC project learned about the models in at least three ways. First, they learned about the model during formal presentations during meetings. Second, they learned from the models by seeing their immediate problems being analyzed through the models. Finally, they learned how to use the models so that they could analyze similar situations later. All three of these forms of learning occurred during the action research.
Another primary characteristic of successful action research is that the immediate problem has been solved (Schein, 1987) . As we shall shortly see, this proved to be the case for CPC. Decisionmakers were able to consider a wide range of security solutions and to focus on those that met their needs.
Qualitative Data Analysis
Proposition1: Interviews at Customer Data, Inc. (CDI)
Based on interpretation of the data gathered through the numerous interviews of managers at CDI, there are grounds for arguing that practitioners feel comfortable with some of the countermeasures embodied in the Security Action Cycle, but not all. Namely, recovering from and preventing a security "incident" were identified by more than 75% of the participants as managerial actions that can be used to deal with systems threats. One participant in this 75% group felt that remedial actions needed to be taken after a break-in. He expressed this sentiment in the following way:
If there is evidence of break-in, maybe looking outside this organization as to who and how but if there is no evidence immediately of break-in, then we try to find out who had access to that information….
Another member of this group commented on how preventives were invoked:
[To attach to the network, there is a …] user authentication procedure you have to go through just to get on the network. Those are built into the product….
Three countermeasures of effective risk management were missing from nearly all of the respondents' concepts of good information security, however. Proactive detective activities were seldom cited. The feedback effect of sanctioning activities was likewise not readily understood by this group of practitioners, this learning effect never being mentioned by study participants in any of the interviews. Finally, even though the first phase of risk management, deterrence, was mentioned, it appeared only in an indirect way. Typically, it was alluded to in statements that greater user awareness would be desirable so that preventive measures would work better and so that detection would be surer if a break-in occurred. One manager, for example, indicated that it was important to be able to have close communications with human resources to prevent fired employees from continuing to access the network:
I would make sure that the local area networking administration has a direct pipe in with human resources because we need to know who is going and who is coming and who went and why and when they took them off the network.
In general, interviewees were not aware of the impact of remedial countermeasures on potential abusers. They were much more aware of the recovery aspects of remedies. From the standpoint of influencing future behavior of potential abusers, however, being capable of recovering from a breach is not really relevant.
One exceptional manager's view illustrates how an insight into the Security Action Cycle could affect overall security planning. Unlike other interviewees, this manager noted that it was critical to internally discipline insiders who intentionally abused the system. He argued that a forceful He goes on to observe that this "hanging tree" effect would "deter" future abuse. Remarks like these indicate clearly that he had a keener intuitive sense for the feedback created by countermeasures than others did.
What is instructive about the perceptions of this firm's managers is that an overwhelmingly positive attitude toward security was not accompanied by a thorough understanding of available security responses. In spite of a strong consensus that the firm lacked an acceptable level of security awareness, interviewees were not generally clear as to how a security awareness program, for example, would have downstream, learning impacts on the major systems threats.
Proposition 1: Action Research at Customer Processing Company (CPC)
To study managerial knowledge of security and whether theory-based concepts and principles of the Security Action Cycle would actually be adopted by managers, a second qualitative study was conducted at Customer Processing Company (CPC).
In the early planning stages, CPC participants revealed the same disposition as those at CDI.
Methods for preventing access to sensitive systems were far and away the most frequently discussed.
Top managers stressed the need to find controls that would inhibit unauthorized access and to implement them as soon as possible. One security team member expresses this view when he reports on the security possibilities of Automatic Number Identification (ANI):
ANI/Caller ID are telecommunications technologies that allow the telephone number of the caller to be electronically transmitted to the party being called. They also provide the ability to display the number at the receiving end. [These technologies would allow CPC…] to receive, and verify, the telephone…requesting access to [our] database.
Over the three month period in the early stages of security planning, methods for preventing access were mentioned an order of magnitude greater than the next class of responses.
Remedies in the event of a security breach were discussed next in frequency. Team members focused on how the firm should proceed in recovering from damage from a major security incident. Of particular concern were adverse media coverage of any security breaches, ways to limit the damage, and correct any underlying problems. Again, as in the case of CDI, the remedies that were identified were closely associated with recovery mechanisms, which have little to no impact on downstream deterrent effects.
Early in the security planning at CPC, little attention was paid to proactive detection of compromised security. Avoiding abuse through passive approaches (deterrents) was likewise infrequently hailed as a security requirement.
Proposition 2: Action Research at Customer Processing Company (CPC)
The intervention at CPC included a series of mini-educational sessions and reports designed to introduce the spectrum of responses in the Security Action Cycle to both the top management and project teams. Thus, during the 5 ½ month period through the first half of the project, it was possible to introduce all three elements: intervention element #1, the Security Risk Planning Model, intervention element #2, security awareness training, and element #3, the Countermeasure Matrix.
With respect to element #3, the multi-tiered nature of the Security Action Cycle was stressed during meetings and reporting sessions. An attempt was made to convey the basic theme that countermeasures such as token-exchanging modems are restricted to a single-tiered effect since they are designed only to prevent unauthorized access. The Countermeasure Matrix was the specific modeling mechanism for making this concept concrete. A control such as a Personal Identification Number (PIN) has an impact on multiple tiers in that it prevents unauthorized access, provides a means to detect and punish an offender, and, with its inherent personal accountability feature, also serves to deter potential abusers. In point of fact, the example given earlier to illustrate how one might populate the Countermeasure Matrix is exactly what did occur in thinking about PINs versus tokenexchanging modems at CDI. Figure 5 shows the results of intervention element #3 on the overall process. Before the intervention, single-tiered security options  options by and large preventive in nature  dominated both groups' thinking. After the intervention, methods that had a multi-tiered impact ("multi-tiered" was the terminology adopted by the security project team) were actively pursued. In the six months following the intervention, multi-tiered methods show distinct signs of being incorporated into planning processes of managers. During the several months immediately following the intervention, in fact, more multi-tiered than single-tiered options were being investigated. What is revealing in this process is that the company did give careful consideration to methods that had a broader and longer term impact on security. Proposition 2, hence, receives support in this analysis.
A good indication of how knowledge of the Security Action Cycle had penetrated the security planning process was the following statement from a report in the seventh month:
There was general agreement [among the firm's top managers] that the company needs to vigorously prosecute any one caught abusing the system. The deterrent impact of such highly publicized prosecutions could be significant.
This statement certainly reflects the consensus that remedies such as prosecution should be considered, but even more importantly, that there will be a feedback impact from such actions and a deterrent effect on the front end of the cycle.
Implications for Research and Practice
Evidence in favor of proposition 1 was found at both sites. In short, managers were generally not equally versed in all countermeasures in the Security Action Cycle. They tended to see computer security as a way to prevent losses and thereby mitigate further downstream damage. Much less frequently were they concerned about how to recover from a security breach or system loss and seek remedies. Moreover, managers were seldom attuned to deterrents as a tool for reducing system risk.
They were even less aware of the value of systematic and purposeful detection. Hardly any participants demonstrated an awareness of the feedback effect of countermeasures.
Given that the present study examined proposition 1 in only two sites (albeit through a reasonable number of participants and documented instances in each site), researchers may want to test the generalizabilty of these findings more broadly. There are reasons to believe that the Security Action
Cycle may be even less well known outside of North America (other than, possibly, Sweden), a circumstance which offers interesting cross-cultural research opportunities.
Proposition 2 also found support in the study. Awareness training, the security planning model, Researchers should also test the viability of theory-based security planning in other contexts.
Little scientific work has been done in this vein, and since deterrence theory has proven to be remarkably versatile in the computer security field in general (e.g., Harrington, 1997) , there are many avenues in security planning to explore through this theory base. An open question, for example, is whether even a well thought-out program will lead to employees internalizing corporate security goals.
Longitudinal research is perhaps best suited to examine a process such as this occurring over time.
Field experiments, moreover, would allow us to conclude more definitively that theory-based tools produce more satisfactory outcomes. Additional action research or field studies could be very helpful in uncovering patterns of security planning and implementation. Using these and alternate techniques, additional studies can also advance knowledge by confirming or disconfirming the Goodhue-Straub (1991) model of managerial concern.
New research opportunities are also suggested by this work. We need further studies in the general concept of risk in the computer security arena. The current work assumes a connection between increased planning and increased safeguards as well as the onward connection between increased safeguards and decreased risk. These assumptions may not be valid. Ironically, the downstream effects of security planning could create additional risks of their own, for instance. Adding security functionality to an existing system  IT or manual  does increase the complexity of the total system, which, in turn, might increase rather than decrease the total risk. Moreover, controls create more closely coupled systems; this also leads to increased risk of failure (Perrow, 1984) . Specifically, the results here indicate that managers are not aware of all of the security countermeasures available to them. Training and planning tools go hand-in-hand in proffering a means to change this situation. Moreover, in spite of the greater challenge posed by theoretically-oriented models, professionals will be well served by mastering and applying these principles to security planning.
But implementers should be cautioned that one shot programs, just like short term management commitment, may have little long term impact (Banerjee, et al., 1998) .
Guidelines for Practice
Adopting the following steps and executing them well, managers can change the security environment in their organizations. Guidelines are presented in a capsulated form as (Luker, 1990) , but the essential point is that some phased approach be utilized. To take action in this area, integrate a security risk approach with the organization's regular IT planning (see also Baskerville, 1993 Guideline 2.1. A prerequisite for devising a protection plan (Eloff, Labuschagne, and Badenhorst, 1993; DeMaio, 1995) and implementing security controls, risk analyses or comprehensive reviews of current security are usually carried out in organizations via teams of security officers and targeted users. Among the options for performing risk assessment, older techniques such as checklists and Courtney's probability risk analysis (1977) are still in use (Baskerville, 1993) . New techniques such as threat tree analysis do not depend on exact probabilities to assess risk, but rather semantic matches to terms like "moderate," "low," and "high" (Weiss, 1991; Smith, 1989) . This is one reason why threat tree analysis is recommended by the US Dept. of Defense (Department of Defense, 1988) .
The point of all of these techniques is to prioritize and then determine the level of risk that is "unacceptable" to the organization. If fifty systems risks are identified, an 80-20 pareto principle may suggest that the firm needs to seriously respond, for example, to only the first sixteen "unacceptable" risks.
Guideline 5.1. Feedback of various kinds is critical for creating a downstream deterrent effect on potential abusers. Managers should initiate routine and exception security reporting practices and then take further actions in this regard. Feedback actually consists of on-going dissemination of security actions taken and policies deployed and it should be more a part of corporate culture than a set of formal, one time exercises. Straub (1986b) and Hoffer and Straub (1994) identify several processes by which managers can communicate security information, values and goals to employees. Conventional departmental meetings and informal discussions are good ways in addition to formal training and educational sessions. Unless suspects have been given due process in a court of law, no offender should be identified by name. Nonetheless, statements about disciplinary actions taken, such as reprimand or dismissal for violation of security policies, will provide the relevant feedback to potential abusers.
Conclusion
No system can be made absolutely secure. In spite of this fact, it is possible to formalize parts of the security system that can be efficiently and effectively formalized, as we have seen. The advantage of such formalization is that it frees up other resources to be used to monitor those parts that cannot be formalized, or were selected not to be formalized. Thus, inadequate security in many organizations is a situation that can and should be remedied.
The present study provides evidence that practitioners are willing and able to adopt theorybased tools for security planning. The interview and action research findings offer empirical support for the propositions that measurable improvements can be made in these critical activities. While there is no doubt that many security consultants have excellent instincts with regard to what works and what does not, these empirical approaches help to raise the discussion above the level of folklore and into the realm of science. Additional work along these lines is very much needed, however. We need an elaboration of their role in order to understand the current organizational structure, with respect to security, and how this structure as it currently exists will be able to adapt to the need to secure the new systems coming on line. A secondary use of this qualitative data will be to assess the overall security personnel structure in order to make recommendations for the implementation and roll- Please think about the broad outlines of the security "incident" described in the following scenario, ponder some questions we are going to ask you, and then give use your answers.
APPENDIX
[Interviewer should hand the interviewee a boldface, large font printed version of the following scenario--the material within quotation marks--to help them answer questions about the two scenarios following.]
"This firm has experienced a security 'incident' in which data, records, files, programs, or computer hardware have been improperly and deliberately used, modified, destroyed, stolen, or damaged. The incident is either internal--that is, originating inside the organization--or external in origin.
The incident has resulted in one or more of the following losses:
(1) financial losses, either unbudgeted expenses, loss of revenues, loss of clients, and/or other direct actual dollar losses,
